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THE  ATS  CAUSE  OF  ACTION  IS SUI  GENERIS
William R. Casto*
INTRODUCTION
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court considered the extraterri-
torial reach of the tort action for violations of customary international law.1
Kiobel was a “foreign-cubed” case in which a foreign plaintiff sued a foreign
defendant for damages arising from conduct in a foreign country.2  The Jus-
tices wrote four different opinions, but they were unanimous in refusing to
create a federal common law tort remedy in a foreign-cubed case.3  At least
they were unanimous in holding that a remedy is not available in a case like
Kiobel.4  Some, including the present author, are disappointed in the Court’s
decision.  But in an important sense, the decision was by definition correct.
When nine Justices of different political and philosophical persuasions reach
a unanimous decision, it is foolhardy, or at least quixotic, to argue that the
Court erred.  As Justice Robert H. Jackson once quipped: “We are not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”5
After Kiobel, the federal courts will have to decide whether any significant6
aspect of the common law tort for violations of international law should sur-
vive the Court’s unanimous decision.
 2014 William R. Casto.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Paul Whitfield Horn Professor, Texas Tech University.  I wish to thank Professors
Doug Cassel, William Dodge, Eugene Kontorovich, and Beth Stephens for their thoughtful
comments and assistance regarding the present article.
1 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
2 Id.
3 See id.; id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring); id.
at 1670 (Breyer, J., concurring).
4 A remedy may be available in a foreign-cubed case implicating a direct U.S. interest,
like protecting the proper operation of the U.S. market system, and probably is available
where an international criminal seeks a retirement or vacation haven in the United States.
See infra notes 144–51, 162–66 and accompanying text.
5 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
6 There are no extraterritorial objections to an international tort action arising from
conduct on American soil, but the likelihood of the federal courts creating a remedy for
such misconduct is quite small. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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In considering whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)7 action survives
Kiobel, the courts should pay careful attention to the action’s sui generis
nature.  We all learned in law school that a cause of action consists of a norm
or rule of conduct that establishes the illegality of particular conduct and a
remedy for the violation of the norm.  We seldom, however, need to pay care-
ful analytical attention to the differences between the norm and the remedy.
With the exception of ATS claims, every cause of action under American law
involves a norm and a remedy legislated by the same sovereign.  In interna-
tional torts, however, the norm and the remedy do not come from the same
sovereign.  The norm comes from international law, and the remedy is legis-
lated by federal courts.
Because ATS actions are sui generis, there is a very real potential for
courts to resort to forms of analysis that make sense in the usual context of
tort litigation and arbitrarily apply these established forms to international
torts.  The presumption against extraterritoriality is an example of a general
tort concept that does not adapt well to ATS claims.8  Rather than using
labels to decide these cases, the courts should adopt a functional analysis
keyed to the international tort’s unique nature.  The ultimate result will be
the same in some cases but may be different in others.
The ATS is a subject matter jurisdiction statute and does not create a
statutory cause of action.  In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court explained that
the ATS “‘clearly does not create a statutory cause of action,’ and . . . the
contrary suggestion is ‘simply frivolous.’”9  Nevertheless there is a relation-
ship between the ATS and the substantive cause of action.  The Sosa Court
held that the ATS should be read as an implicit congressional authorization
or approval of tort remedies to be fashioned by the federal courts as federal
common law.10  This notion of common law stemming from a grant of juris-
diction is not new.  The federal common law of admiralty11 and of collective
bargaining agreements12 usually are traced to grants of jurisdiction.13  But a
congressional authorization to create federal common law is significantly dif-
ferent from a legislative cause of action.  In the latter situation, Congress has
legislated a remedy and a norm or rule of conduct, and determining the
7 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
8 See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.  Another tort concept that is a bad fit
for ATS claims is the idea of official capacity. See William R. Casto, Notes on Official Immu-
nity in ATS Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 580–86 (2011).
9 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (quoting William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective
Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,
479–80 (1986)).
10 Id. at 720.
11 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 654–59 (6th ed. 2009).  Admiralty law is common law in the sense that
it is judge-made law.
12 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); see FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 663–65.
13 The better view is that these areas of the law are intrinsically federal. See FALLON ET
AL., supra note 11, at 653–54.
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substantive scope of the cause of action is almost entirely a matter of statutory
interpretation.  In the former, the statute is silent on the substantive issue of
who should win or lose on the merits.  The grant of jurisdiction simply tells
the courts the general subject matter that the common law action should
address.  The actual substantive contours of the cause of action that dictate
who should win or lose are left to the courts’ sound discretion.14  For exam-
ple, the ATS says nothing about a possible defense of official immunity or
how clearly a norm of international law must be established in order to sup-
port a remedy.  The courts have assumed these and other tasks.15
While the ATS provides few significant insights into the substantive
scope of the international tort action, clear congressional guidance lies hid-
den in plain sight.  In 1992, Congress expressly endorsed the modern con-
cept of an international tort action by enacting the Torture Victim Protection
Act (TVPA).16  In doing so, the Congress consciously codified Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala,17 which was a foreign-cubed case.  The TVPA cannot be read as
anything other than a conscious determination that even in a foreign-cubed
case, U.S. law should provide a tort remedy for violations of the international
law against torture and extrajudicial killings.
If Congress has overtly considered and enacted a statutory rule of deci-
sion for the international torts of torture and extrajudicial killing, the courts
should treat the statutory rule as something akin to persuasive precedent in
ATS actions.  Thus in the TVPA, Congress explicitly addressed the extent to
which the availability of a remedy under another country’s laws should pre-
clude a TVPA remedy, and the same issue may arise in an ATS action.
Although the TVPA on its face does not apply to an ATS claim involving the
slave trade or aiding and abetting torture, the courts should nevertheless
defer to Congress’s expressed political wisdom regarding the availability of a
remedy under a foreign nation’s law.18
14 This has been the practice regarding the admiralty grants of jurisdiction, which
have been construed as authorizing the federal courts to fashion a judge-made admiralty
law. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
15 See Casto, supra note 8, at 580–86 (discussing courts’ development of federal com-
mon law of official immunity); infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text (noting courts’
development of the norms to be vindicated).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
17 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
18 In crafting the TVPA, Congress consciously grappled with the relevance of the avail-
ability of remedies in other countries and legislated an exhaustion requirement.  Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note).  Surely Congress’s consciously expressed political wisdom
should be embraced by courts for ATS litigation. See William R. Casto, The New Federal
Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 660–61
(2006).  Unfortunately, some courts have preferred their own political judgment on this
issue to Congress’s. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 754–55 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (refusing to accept defendant’s argument “that exhaustion is always required”
for all claims).
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The present Article occasionally invokes the political wisdom or judg-
ment found in the TVPA.  In fashioning common law rules, judges are not
bound by the TVPA, but judges should give serious consideration to the Act’s
statutory precedent.  If a court chooses to ignore the clear implications of an
analogous TVPA rule, the court, as a practical matter, may be substituting its
political judgment for Congress’s judgment.  To repeat, however, the idea of
deference to a formally enacted congressional judgment should apply only if
the relevant TVPA rule stemmed from conscious congressional
decisionmaking.
In some cases, an issue may arise under the TVPA that Congress has not
consciously considered.  In these cases, courts construing the TVPA itself
must grapple with the Act’s particular words and give the TVPA a reasonable
judicial construction.  In this situation, the judicial construction is not based
upon Congress’s conscious political judgment.  When a rule of decision
under the TVPA is not based upon Congress’s considered political judgment,
there is no basis for deferring to the TVPA rule in an ATS case.
This Article begins by recalling the distinctions among the entirely dif-
ferent concepts of subject matter jurisdiction, the norms giving rise to a tort
action, and the remedy.19  Then the Article turns to the Justices’ opinions in
Kiobel with special attention paid to the Chief Justice’s use of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality.20  Finally, the Article considers situations in
which the United States has a distinct interest that easily justifies an extrater-
ritorial remedy.21
I. ANATOMY OF AN INTERNATIONAL TORT ACTION
All complaints in federal court are divided into three parts.22  Because
our national courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the first paragraph of
every federal complaint must allege the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
The rest of the complaint presents the plaintiff’s substantive claim.  The sec-
ond part of the complaint, which takes up the most space, describes particu-
lar conduct by the defendant that violates some legal norm or rule of
conduct.  The third and final part, which frequently is a single sentence,
prays for a judicial remedy.  Each of these three parts implicates legal rules
that are quite different from the other two.  At least that is the theory.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS is only a subject
matter jurisdiction statute and does not create a cause of action.23  The stat-
ute merely provides that a federal court may adjudicate an international tort
19 See infra Part I.
20 See infra Part II.
21 See infra Part III.
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).  Of course, there are also defenses that must be raised by the
defendant. Id. 8(b).
23 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
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action and is therefore silent on the tort action’s substantive contours.24
Moreover, there is evidence that sophisticated members of the first federal
Congress understood this distinction between substance and jurisdiction and
viewed the Judiciary Act’s jurisdictional provisions in this light.25
The Sosa Court also addressed the substantive scope of the international
tort action and held that the legal norm or rule of conduct comes from inter-
national law, but that the remedy is provided by domestic federal common
law.26  The ironic result is that Sosa turned the ATS into a redundant anach-
ronism.  Most people believe that customary international law is a peculiar
type of federal common law.27  Moreover, the remedy clearly is controlled by
traditional federal common law.  Therefore the well-pleaded complaint in an
international tort action is replete with federal questions.  The plaintiff may
not prevail without first alleging a violation of international law, which is
technically classified as federal law, and then establishing that federal law
provides a remedy.  There is no state law or foreign domestic law anywhere in
the complaint.  As a result, the courts’ general federal question jurisdiction
embraces international tort actions, and the ATS is an anachronistic redun-
dancy insofar as jurisdiction is concerned.28
B. Legal Norm or Rule of Conduct
In international tort actions, the legal norm or rule of conduct comes
from international law—not the domestic law of the United States or of any
other country.  We classify customary international law as federal common
law, but this particular type of common law is unlike any other.29  Like the
tort action, it is sui generis.  In our modern legal culture, the phrase “common
law” has come to mean legal principles legislated by judges.  In legislating
common law, judges fashion legal rules that they, the judges, believe make
sense for our society.  In contrast, international law may not be legislated by
any particular country.30  When a federal court applies international law as
federal common law, the court lacks legislative authority.  In international
tort actions, a court discovers pre-existing rules of conduct that have been
24 Id.
25 Id. at 713; Casto, supra note 9, at 479 n.60.
26 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–29.
27 See Casto, supra note 18, at 641; see also infra notes 29 and 31 and accompanying text
(elaborating on customary international law’s status as “federal common law”).
28 Casto, supra note 18, at 664–65.  In this respect, the ATS is like the many specialized
federal question statutes in the U.S. Code that were enacted when the general federal
question statute had an amount-in-controversy requirement.  After the removal of the
amount-in-controversy requirement in the general statute, specialized federal question stat-
utes no longer served any purpose, with a few exceptions not relevant to ATS claims. See
FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 746–47.
29 Casto, supra note 18, at 641–42.  As a practical matter, classifying international law
as federal law empowers the Supreme Court to correct erroneous state court interpreta-
tions of international law.
30 See Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 115, 116
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 6  8-MAY-14 8:48
1550 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
“‘legislated’ through the political actions of the governments of the world’s
States.”31  The special provenance of the norms remedied in international
tort actions should play a significant role with respect to the tort’s extraterri-
torial reach.
In Sosa, the Court held that the international norms to be remedied
must be “accepted by the civilized world and defined with . . . specificity.”32
Kiobel elaborates upon this limitation by noting that the international law
norm must be “‘specific, universal, and obligatory.’”33  This requirement of
universal acceptance and specificity is best viewed as a prudential, remedial
concept and not as a principle of international law.34  Because the require-
ment is domestic common law and not international law, it should be viewed
as a remedial limitation.
The requirements of specificity and universal acceptance drastically
shorten the list of international law norms remedied by the common law tort.
In addition, suits for torture and nonjudicial killing are preempted by the
TVPA.  As a practical matter, one of the most significant remaining rules of
conduct is the norm that forbids aiding and abetting torture and nonjudicial
killing.35  The apparent depredations in Kiobel clearly fit the international
rule of conduct regarding aiding and abetting.  Shell was not providing indi-
rect assistance to a foreign government’s implementation of a policy unre-
lated to Shell’s direct interests.  The plaintiffs alleged that Shell’s subsidiary
provided Nigerian military and police forces with “food, transportation, and
compensation” for the purpose of attacking remote villages and “beating,
raping, killing, and arresting residents.”36  This alleged direct support of
Nigerian kill teams cannot have been a lark or a frolic.  If true, the only
credible explanation is that Shell sought to facilitate a more economical
extraction of natural resources by aiding and abetting the killing and tortur-
31 Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1561–62 (1984).
32 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004); accord Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1671 (Breyer,
J., concurring); see also Casto, supra note 18, at 652–54.
33 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
34 See Ingrid Wuerth, Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2010).  Professor Wuerth concludes that the norm to be
enforced is therefore a domestic-law norm. Id. at 1936–37.  Classifying the requirement as
a remedial limitation avoids confusion over the problem of extraterritoriality and is more
in keeping with the Supreme Court’s description of the tort.
35 See, e.g., Romero v. Drummard Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315–16 (11th Cir. 2008) (recog-
nizing that the ATS allows plaintiffs to seek relief for claims of aiding and abetting torture
and extrajudicial killing); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1078–98 (C.D. Cal.
2010), order vacated sub nom. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing that aiding and abetting of human rights abuses, with respect to the facts at issue, did
not meet the requirements of specificity and international acceptance required by the
ATS).  In addition, international law clearly outlaws a few other attacks on life and human
dignity including the slave trade and genocide.
36 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 7  8-MAY-14 8:48
2014] the  ats  cause  of  action  is S U I G E N E R I S 1551
ing of villagers who were “protesting the environmental effects of [Shell’s]
practices.”37
C. Remedy
The legal norm or rule of conduct is used to determine whether the
defendant has acted unlawfully.  The remedy establishes the legal conse-
quences of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.  As a matter of practice, Ameri-
can lawyers instinctively understand this difference, but we usually roll the
two concepts together into a single, almost seamless concept called a cause of
action.  Nevertheless, remedial rules are quite different from rules of con-
duct.  For example, we all know that even if a defendant is acting unlawfully,
a court will not grant the remedy of an injunction if the plaintiff’s remedy at
law is adequate.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has held in a series of cases
that a private plaintiff who is harmed by the defendant’s violation of an act of
Congress is not entitled to a remedy unless the act clearly provides a private
remedy.38
The distinction between a legal norm or rule of conduct and the conse-
quent remedy is charged with enormous significance in international tort
actions.  The norm and the remedy come from two entirely different sources
of law.  The norm comes from international law, which is based upon the
practice of nations.  International law norms have been crafted by the com-
munity of nations to regulate the entire world.  In contrast, the remedy
comes from idiosyncratic U.S. domestic law, which is legislated by the United
States and by no other nation.
Because the United States lacks unilateral power to legislate interna-
tional law, virtually all the restrictions imposed upon international tort
actions are best viewed as domestic law and not international law. Kiobel’s
holding that the tort remedy is not available in a foreign-cubed case is a
remedial restriction imposed as a matter of domestic federal common law.
This particular restriction, however, is just one of many restrictions imposed
upon the remedy, and many of the other restrictions are pertinent to the
issue of extraterritoriality.39  As a practical matter, and without regard to
issues of extraterritoriality, the panoply of limitations effectively bars the fed-
eral courts from roaming the world to correct any and all wrongs.
Insofar as the issue of extraterritoriality is concerned, the most signifi-
cant remedial restriction is that the international norm must be accepted by
the civilized world.  Because international law is not always clear, there is a
danger that federal judges might err in deciding that a particular category of
conduct violates international law.  If the judge were wrong, the judge would,
as a practical matter, be applying an idiosyncratic domestic rule of conduct to
regulate activities in a foreign country.  The requirement of acceptance
37 Id. at 1662.
38 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 11, at 690–715.
39 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing exhaustion, forum non
conveniens, comity, and executive branch statements of interest).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 8  8-MAY-14 8:48
1552 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
guards against judges imposing domestic rules of conduct under the guise of
international law.  This is not to suggest that judges would consciously do so.
The problem is most realistically viewed as one of mistake rather than one of
abuse of power.  The requirement of acceptance is a bulwark against these
mistakes and also against a judge’s wishful belief that a norm exists when it
does not.
There are other restrictions relevant to the issue of extraterritoriality.  As
early as 1795, the Attorney General of the United States suggested that a
federal court could not try an international tort action unless the court had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.40  This limitation requires that
defendants have at least some contacts with the territory of the United States.
The minimum contacts necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction may not be
sufficient in and of themselves to justify supplying a remedy for a defendant’s
overseas misconduct,41 but there is no doubt that this requirement effectively
excludes the vast majority of the world’s disputes from courts in the United
States.
In addition, other significant limitations to the international tort remedy
include forum non conveniens42 and official immunity.43  Moreover, a remedy
is not available in a U.S. court if the country where the tort took place pro-
vides a meaningful remedy.44  Finally, the Court in Sosa noted that in resolv-
ing particular disputes, the courts should pay serious attention to the
executive branch’s statements of interest in respect of particular cases.45  The
executive branch’s authority to provide the courts with ad hoc advice is espe-
cially relevant to the issue of extraterritoriality.46
II. THE JUSTICES’ OPINIONS
The Justices wrote four opinions in Kiobel, and they all concluded that
the tort remedy was not available.  The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy did
not announce a general rule.  They literally restricted themselves to the par-
ticular facts of Kiobel.  Justice Alito, with Justice Thomas concurring, went
beyond the facts and espoused an approach to extraterritoriality that would,
as a practical matter, eliminate the international tort action.  Justice Breyer,
40 See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (stating that a crime “may
be legally prosecuted . . . in any district wherein the offenders may be found”).
41 In Kiobel, the Chief Justice properly noted that mere corporate presence in the
United States is not enough to justify providing a tort remedy for the corporation’s miscon-
duct overseas.  133 S. Ct. at 1669; see also id. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Thus I agree
with the Court that here it would ‘reach too far to say’ that such ‘mere corporate presence
suffices.’” (quoting id. at 1669 (majority opinion)).
42 See id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
43 See Casto, supra note 8.
44 See Casto, supra note 18, at 659–61 (discussing parallel remedial schemes under
foreign law).
45 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); accord Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that a judicial policy of “giving weight to the views of
the Executive Branch” should “minimize international friction”).
46 See infra notes 118–43 and accompanying text.
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with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurring, also went beyond
the facts and argued for an approach that would allow an extraterritorial
remedy in some cases involving a distinct U.S. interest.
A. The Chief Justice’s Opinion
The Court’s opinion, written by Chief Justice Roberts, analyzed the issue
of extraterritoriality as turning on the well-known presumption against extra-
territoriality.  According to the Chief Justice, the issue in Kiobel involved the
scope of a “proper claim under the ATS.”47  After a careful exploration of the
ATS’s original enactment in 1789, he concluded that nothing in the ATS
rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality.48  Much of his exploration
is technically flawed and, more fundamentally, gives insufficient attention to
the sui generis nature of the common law tort action for violations of interna-
tional law.  If, however, focus is shifted from the presumption against extra-
territoriality to the Chief Justice’s clearly expressed concerns regarding
Kiobel’s foreign policy implications, his conclusion makes sense.  Every mem-
ber of the Court relied upon foreign policy concerns to deny an extraterrito-
rial remedy.
Any exploration of the ATS’s original enactment to determine the sub-
stantive scope of the international tort action is an anachronistic and fruitless
enterprise.  At the outset, there is a technical problem.  The original ATS49 is
no longer the law and has not been the law since 1873 when Congress reen-
acted the statute with changes.50  In 1911, Congress again reenacted the stat-
ute with another change51 and finally reenacted it a third time in 1948 with
additional changes.52  Throughout these reenactments, Congress presuma-
bly assumed that it was simply carrying forward the statute’s original subject
matter jurisdiction principle, and therefore the ATS’s origins continue to be
relevant to its current jurisdictional scope.53  There is no evidence, however,
that Congress ever thought of the substantive scope of the authorized com-
mon law cause of action other than the reasonable assumption that the
action would be a tort claim for violation of international law.
47 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
48 Id. at 1666–69.
49 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2006)).
50 1 Rev. Stat. § 563(16) (1875).  The amendment deleted the original ATS’s express
recognition of state court concurrent jurisdiction. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9, with Rev. Stat. § 563(16) (illustrating the amendment).
51 The 1911 reenactment added a comma after the word “only.”  Act of March 3, 1911,
Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087, 109.  Some have argued that the comma has affected the
statute’s jurisdictional scope. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 518, 519 & n.352 (2011).
52 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
53 In Sosa, the Court noted that since 1789, “Congress has not in any relevant way
amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.”  Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).  This statement makes sense in respect of the scope of
jurisdiction conferred.
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The concept of extraterritoriality is used to define the substantive scope
of a tort action and is not a principle of subject matter jurisdiction.  In Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,54 the Court corrected the lower courts’
misimpression that extraterritoriality limits subject matter jurisdiction.  In
the Court’s words, “to ask what conduct [the statute] reaches is to ask what
conduct [the statute] prohibits, which is a merits question.  Subject-matter
jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.’”55
Notwithstanding the ATS’s well-established jurisdictional nature, the Act
has influenced the Court’s analysis of the availability on the merits of a tort
remedy.  In Sosa, the Court reasoned that the first federal Congress must
have assumed that a common law remedy for some violations of international
law was available.56  Therefore we may reasonably infer that the Act recog-
nizes legislative power in the federal courts to create a common law remedy.
In the Court’s words, the ATS is “ ‘best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for [a]
modest number of international law violations.’”57  It should be noted in this
regard that the Court’s analysis posits a congressional recognition of the fed-
eral courts’ legislative power to create common law remedies.  No one in
eighteenth-century America believed that the common law was legislated by
judges.58  If our focus shifts from the statute’s original enactment to the most
recent reenactment in 1948, the analysis becomes sensible.  By 1948, sophisti-
cated American lawyers had come to believe that the common law is a pecu-
liar body of law legislated by judges.59
Although the ATS authorizes the creation of a common law remedy, the
Act is significantly different from a statutory cause of action.  In a statutory
cause of action, Congress creates both the norm and the remedy, and deter-
mining the action’s substantive scope is essentially a matter of statutory inter-
pretation.  In sharp contrast, the ATS creates neither a norm nor a remedy.
Therefore, interpretative rules developed to divine Congress’s purpose
regarding the substantive scope of a statutory claim are not directly
applicable.
The Court’s reading of the ATS is similar to the traditional understand-
ing of the statutes vesting the courts with subject matter jurisdiction over
admiralty cases and collective bargaining agreements.  These two latter stat-
utes usually are read as authorizing the courts to legislate a federal common
54 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
55 Id. at 2877 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Train-
men Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 585 (2009)); accord Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (citing Morrison for the proposition that “the
question of extraterritorial application” is “not a question of jurisdiction”).
56 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
57 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (alteration in original) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724).
58 See generally William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revo-
lutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907 (1988) (discussing the shift to positivism in the United States
and the relatively fast acceptance of the Erie doctrine that resulted).
59 See id. at 934, 945–46.
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law of admiralty and collective bargaining agreements.60  The plain meaning
of these statutes obviously limits the substantive scope of the authorized com-
mon law to maritime issues and the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, but the courts have never consulted these grants of jurisdiction
to determine any of the substantive details of the authorized common law.
In the case of maritime litigation, the courts have essentially ignored the
statute’s reference to admiralty.  Professors Grant Gilmore and Charles Black
concluded that, “[a]s was inevitable when the ‘maritime law’ was placed in
the hands of judges trained in the Anglo-American common law tradition,
maritime law amongst us has been heavily influenced, substantively and
methodologically, by shoreside law.”61  Similarly, Professor David Robertson
concluded that “it has been taken as settled that United States courts are not
bound to follow any segment of the international maritime law.”62
There is another problem with looking at the ATS to determine the sub-
stantive scope of the authorized action.  The statute was enacted over two
hundred years ago.  The same act that created the ATS also vested the federal
courts with admiralty jurisdiction.63  Presumably members of the First Con-
gress believed that the newly created federal courts would resort to then-prev-
alent principles of admiralty law to resolve maritime claims.  Does that mean
that more than two centuries later, substantive admiralty law should be fro-
zen in the late eighteenth century or in some way significantly controlled by
the original grant of jurisdiction?  The merits of a twenty-first-century tort
claim arising from twenty-first-century misconduct should be governed by
twenty-first-century principles.  So it is with admiralty law,64 and so it should
be with international tort actions.
Setting aside the problem of anachronism, there is a more fundamental
objection to using the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the
international tort action.  At the beginning of the Court’s opinion, the Chief
Justice explained that the interpretive rule against extraterritoriality “reflects
the ‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world.’”65  The international tort action, however, is quite unlike the
usual statutory claim.  The international action is sui generis.  It gives effect to
rules of conduct that have been recognized by all the civilized world to rule
the entire world.  The United States does not rule the world, but interna-
tional law does.  All the world’s nations are bound by international law.
60 See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
61 GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 46 (2d ed. 1975).
62 DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 138 (1970).
63 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)).
64 See, e.g., Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (applying the
modern view of wrongful death actions); see also supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text
(discussing the shift to positivism in the United States).
65 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (quoting
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
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Without exception, every precedent in the Court’s opinion regarding
the presumption against extraterritoriality involved the interpretation of an
act of Congress that created a stand-alone cause of action.  All of the prece-
dents involved statutory schemes in which Congress has legislated norms or
rules of conduct and provided a damage remedy for violations of the norm.
When Congress creates a domestic statutory cause of action, the purpose usu-
ally is to regulate a domestic problem.  Therefore in the absence of congres-
sional guidance, the interpretive presumption stacking the deck against
extraterritoriality makes sense.  But the rule of conduct in international tort
actions is, by definition, designed to regulate the entire world.
For example, the Kiobel Court invoked Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.66 nine times67 as the leading precedent for the presumption.  The plain-
tiffs in that case were Australians who purchased shares in an Australian cor-
poration.68  The shares were listed on the Australian Stock Exchange Limited
but were not traded on any American exchange.69  The foreign plaintiffs
sued the foreign corporation for violations of U.S. securities laws.70  The
plaintiffs contended that an act of Congress imposed substantive rules of con-
duct on an Australian corporation’s conduct towards Australian shareholders
who purchased their shares in Australia on an Australian exchange.71  The
Court’s decision that Congress did not intend to dictate to Australians how to
treat each other in Australia should come as no surprise.72
Because the international tort action does not involve the United States’
imposition of idiosyncratic American rules of conduct upon activities in a
foreign nation, the presumption against extraterritoriality should not be
applied to this sui generis tort.  The difference between the international tort
and the usual statutory cause of action, however, should not be pressed too
far.  The difference is a prudential factor rather than a logical juggernaut.
There is little doubt that the mere availability of the remedy might have an
impact upon conduct in a foreign country.73  Nevertheless the difference is
66 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
67 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661, 1664–67, 1669.
68 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
69 Id. at 2875.
70 Id. at 2876.
71 See id. at 2875–76, 2888.
72 See id. at 2883, 2888.
73 Professor Anthony Colangelo argues that the problem of extraterritoriality does not
arise in ATS litigation because the norm or rule of conduct comes from international law.
See Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudica-
tive Jurisdiction, 28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65 (2013); Anthony J. Colangelo, The Alien Tort Statute
and the Law of Nations in Kiobel and Beyond, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1329 (2013).  But he presses
the norm’s special provenance too far.  He believes that the problem of extraterritoriality
has no relevance to the process of fashioning a federal common law remedy.  There is little
doubt, however, that the availability of this tort remedy may have some impact on how
people conduct themselves in a foreign country.  Justice Holmes’s “bad man” analysis is
relevant: “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences” of his actions.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).  Without a legal remedy, the “mate-
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significant because the rules of conduct are not idiosyncratic American rules.
They are rules created by the world’s nations to govern the world.  There-
fore, as a general proposition, there is no conflict between the international
tort’s rules of conduct and the legitimate domestic rules of conduct legislated
by each of the world’s nations.74
The Kiobel Court briefly recognized the difference between ATS claims
and the statutory cause-of-action cases that created and elaborated upon the
presumption against extraterritoriality, but the Court may not have fully ana-
lyzed the distinction between international tort actions and statutory causes
of action.  In a brief, conclusory sentence the Court noted that there may be
some differences between international tort actions and statutory causes of
action, “[b]ut we think the principles underlying the canon of interpretation
similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that may be brought
under the ATS.”75  Actually, the principles underlying the canon of interpre-
tation are significantly weaker in the context of an international tort action.
We may reasonably indulge a presumption that when Congress legislates
rules of conduct, it has in mind domestic activities.  But the ATS does not
create rules of conduct.  The ATS is an open-ended grant of jurisdiction over
violations of international law—law that by definition rules the entire world.
More significantly, in a leading case, Justice Holmes considered the
plaintiff’s contention that the federal antitrust statute regulated how people
should treat each other in Panama.76  Holmes was surprised by this conten-
tion because “the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done.”77  Of course, in international tort actions, “the char-
acter of an act as lawful or unlawful” is not determined by U.S. law.  The rule
of conduct comes from international law.  There is no doubt that the interna-
tional legal rule against aiding and abetting torture and nonjudicial killing
applies in Nigeria.
Although the presumption against extraterritoriality does not easily fit
international tort actions, one of the bases for the presumption is clearly
implicated by some of these tort actions.  Foreign policy problems may arise
when the United States regulates activities in a foreign country.  The Chief
Justice explained that the presumption “‘serves to protect against unin-
tended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
rial consequences” of a corporation’s despicable misconduct in a foreign country are sig-
nificantly diminished.
74 In the United States, this general proposition is at the heart of the Charming Betsy
canon that, where possible, domestic law should be construed not to violate international
law.  Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
75 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
76 See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 85
(1998).
77 American Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356.
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result in international discord.’”78  The problem of unintended clashes, how-
ever, is not nearly as significant in international tort actions because there is
no legitimate clash between clearly established principles of international law
and the domestic law of any country.  The Chief Justice also noted that “[t]he
presumption . . . helps ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt
an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign policy consequences not
clearly intended by the political branches.”79  Surely every member of the
Court agrees with this fundamental vision of the proper allocation of foreign
policy powers among the three branches of government.  In respect of for-
eign policy matters, either Congress or the executive (depending upon the
issue) is at the top of the totem pole, and the judiciary is at the bottom.
When the Chief Justice turned from the interpretive presumption to the
common law tort, he reiterated his foreign policy concerns by quoting exten-
sively from the Sosa Court’s opinion regarding foreign policy.80
A sound argument can be made that the foreign policy implications of
cases like Kiobel are significantly attenuated because U.S. courts are merely
giving effect to a rule of conduct that the entire world, including Nigeria,
agrees is applicable to conduct in Nigeria.  Presumably the Chief Justice and
the other members of the Court believe that the provision of a damage rem-
edy is the real problem in cases like Kiobel.
If the presumption against extraterritoriality were not used in interna-
tional tort litigation, there is reason to believe that foreign policy considera-
tions would lead the Court to reach the same result in foreign-cubed cases
like Kiobel.  Justice Breyer, with three Justices concurring, did not believe that
the presumption against extraterritoriality was applicable.81  Nevertheless, he
agreed with the Court’s conclusion.
In Kiobel, the Chief Justice indicated that the presumption against extra-
territoriality served as a proxy for foreign policy concerns.82  If so, the proxy
serves no apparent purpose in classes of cases that do not implicate serious
foreign policy concerns. Kiobel should be read as being based upon foreign
policy concerns and not the blind application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.  In classes of cases without significant foreign policy con-
cerns, the presumption would serve no purpose other than to create an arbi-
trary limitation to the remedy.
In Kiobel, the Chief Justice also expressed a concern that providing a
remedy would mean that other nations “could hale our citizens into their
courts for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the United
States, or anywhere else in the world.”83  By renouncing extraterritoriality in
78 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)).
79 Id.
80 See id. at 1664–65.
81 Id. at 1670 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82 See id. at 1664 (majority opinion).
83 Id. at 1669.
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Kiobel, the Court avoided “such serious foreign policy consequences, and . . .
defer[red] such decisions, quite appropriately, to the political branches.”84
Justice Breyer responded to this specific concern by referencing a broad
array of limiting principles that restrict the international tort action to a nar-
row range of relatively uncontroversial cases.85  These limiting principles
“obviate the majority’s concern that our jurisdictional example would lead
other nations . . . to hale our citizens into their courts.”86  Another response
to the Chief Justice’s concern is that the issue has already been resolved by
the political branches.  When Congress considered enacting the TVPA, the
Bush I Administration expressed this very concern and a minority of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee expressly reiterated it in the Senate report of the bill
that became the TVPA.87  Congress, however, was unpersuaded and enacted
the TVPA, which President George H.W. Bush then signed into law.  Like-
wise, the Chief Justice’s concern has no relevance when the United States
hales its own citizens into its own courts.88
In addition to Justice Breyer’s response and Congress’s prior institu-
tional rejection of the proposition, there is a powerful empirical argument
against the Chief Justice’s theoretical concern.  The courts in ATS cases, and
Congress in the TVPA, have already let the cat out of the bag.  Foreign
nations are not particularly interested in the peculiar United States’ alloca-
tion of legislative power between the judiciary and the legislature.  From the
viewpoint of foreign nations, the United States has been providing a world-
wide tort remedy for over thirty years.  Moreover, it is an empirical fact that
foreign nations have not haled our citizens into their courts.89  Perhaps other
nations have not returned the favor because, as Justice Breyer has noted, the
United States’ tort remedy is severely restricted by an array of limiting princi-
ples unrelated to extraterritoriality.  In any event, in the thirty-plus years
since U.S. courts began trying international tort actions, the Chief Justice’s
concern has not reached fruition.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring).
86 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 15 (1991) (stating the minority views of Senators Simpson
and Grassley).
88 See Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court
Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773, 1778–79 (2014).
89 In over thirty years, the only significant litigation against one of our citizens in
another country’s courts apparently is a 2009 conviction in absentia of a CIA station chief
in Italy. See Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1467, 1535 n.384 (2014).  The case was a criminal prosecution for kidnapping and
rendition (presumably for torture) in Italy of an Italian resident.  If the alleged facts are
true, this case bears no resemblance to ATS claims.  The defendant simply violated domes-
tic Italian criminal law in Italy.  Moreover, the defendant was prosecuted by the Italian
government itself, and not by the victim. See Jim Yardly, Italy: Former C.I.A. Chief Requests
Pardon for 2009 Rendition Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2013, at A7, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/world/europe/italy-former-cia-chief-requests-pardon-for-
2009-rendition-conviction.html.
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There is reason to believe that the majority would reconsider the value
of the presumption against extraterritoriality in classes of cases that do not
significantly implicate foreign policy concerns.  One of the more significant
aspects of the majority opinion is what the Court did not hold.  In the final
paragraph of the Chief Justice’s opinion, he concluded, “On these facts, all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”90  Elsewhere, the
Chief Justice has warned against reaching beyond the facts of a case to decide
issues not before a court.  He believes that “the cardinal principle of jurisdic-
tional restraint [is] if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to
decide more.”91  If the Chief Justice’s concluding words in Kiobel are taken
literally, the Court’s decision should be read as not intimating an opinion
regarding cases that are not foreign-cubed92 and perhaps even foreign-cubed
cases in which the United States has a distinct interest.93
B. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court’s opinion and, like the Chief
Justice, assumed that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied.  In
addition, he elaborated on the Chief Justice’s final statement that “[o]n these
facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States.”94  Justice
Kennedy made explicit what was implicit in the Chief Justice’s opinion.  He
noted that future “cases may arise . . . [not] covered by . . . the reasoning and
holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of
the presumption against extraterritorial applications may require some fur-
ther elaboration and explanation.”95
C. Justice Alito’s Opinion
Justice Alito, with Justice Thomas concurring, took the most extreme
position regarding the existence of an ATS cause of action.  As a practical
matter, he wants to eliminate the entire international tort action.  He
believes that the remedy should be available only when a defendant’s
“domestic conduct [in the United States] is sufficient to violate an interna-
tional law norm that satisfies Sosa[ ].”96  His approach would be the death
knell for ATS claims.  Independent of international law, the United States
maintains a robust system of common law and constitutional tort remedies.
Given this empirical fact, it is highly unlikely that a single member of the
Court, much less Justices Alito and Thomas, would vote to enable plaintiffs to
90 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added).
91 PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s limited resources, and its obligation to pro-
vide guidance to all the nation’s courts justify a less strict philosophy of judicial restraint.
92 See infra notes 152–61 and accompanying text.
93 See infra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
94 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
95 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
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use an international tort action to make an end run around existing domestic
law tort actions in a case involving domestic misconduct.97  Perhaps Justice
Alito decided that discretion was the better part of valor.  It is a little late in
the day to argue that the international tort action does not exist.  The lower
courts have been adjudicating these claims for nearly forty years, and Con-
gress has endorsed the idea by enacting the TVPA.  Finally, the Court’s Sosa
opinion embraced the concept while setting limits to the action’s scope.
D. Justice Breyer’s Opinion
Justice Breyer, with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, agreed
that the tort remedy should not be extended to a foreign-cubed case like
Kiobel.98  Justice Breyer, however—like Justice Alito—chose to address poten-
tial fact patterns not present in Kiobel.
The language of Justice Breyer’s opinion makes frequent use of the word
“jurisdiction” without stating whether he means legislative jurisdiction or the
federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.  For example, he states more than
once that, “[i]n this case . . . the parties and relevant conduct lack sufficient
ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction.”99  When Justice
Breyer and the other Justices make superficially ambiguous statements like
this, they cannot possibly be referring to the courts’ subject matter jurisdic-
tion.  The issue in Kiobel was extraterritoriality—not subject matter jurisdic-
tion—and extraterritoriality simply is not a subject matter jurisdiction
concept.100  In Kiobel, the Court reached the merits of the claim.  If the Kiobel
case had been dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
would have been free to refile in a state court of general jurisdiction.101
The best reading of Justice Breyer’s opinion is that most of his refer-
ences to jurisdiction refer to the federal courts’ legislative jurisdiction or
power to make common law, and not the courts’ subject matter jurisdiction
to adjudicate particular claims.  For example, he wrote, “[W]e should look to
international jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdic-
tional scope.”102  Then he immediately turned to sections 402 to 404 of the
current Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law,103 which cover a coun-
try’s power to legislate substantive laws that regulate conduct.104  These sec-
97 See Casto, supra note 18, at 657–59.
98 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
99 Id.; see also id. at 1674 (“I would interpret the statute as providing jurisdiction only
where distinct American interests are at issue.”); id. at 1677 (“Applying these jurisdictional
principles to this case . . . I agree with the Court that jurisdiction does not lie.”).
100 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); see also supra
notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
101 Moreover, the case would not be removable to federal court because the district
court would lack subject matter jurisdiction.
102 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
103 Id.
104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
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tions do not address the concept of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a
claim.105
To a certain extent, Justice Breyer’s reliance on the Restatement is mis-
placed.  The issue of extraterritoriality in ATS is whether courts should exer-
cise their conferred common law powers to create a remedy.  The Restatement
addresses the limits of a country’s power to prescribe and is silent on the
issue of whether a country, acting within the limits of international law,
should exercise its legislative authority.  Nevertheless, to the extent that
countries generally recognize legislative authority over particular categories
of cases, the creation of a tort remedy should not present significant foreign
policy problems.
Like the Chief Justice, Justice Breyer reads the ATS as empowering
courts to legislate a federal common law of remedies for violations of interna-
tional law.106  But unlike the Chief Justice, he does not read the ATS as being
neutral on the substantive scope of the remedy.107  He starts with an assump-
tion that the statute directs courts to legislate a damage remedy against
pirates and their modern-day counterparts.108  He apparently uses this con-
cept of modern-day pirates to encompass the obvious fact that customary
international law has changed since 1789.109  At the same time, he sees com-
ity as a counterbalance to the statute’s nudge toward the creation of a rem-
edy.110  The decision to create a remedy must “be consistent with those
notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of
other nations by limiting the reach of its own laws and their enforcement.”111
As a matter of respect for a foreign country’s sovereignty, Justice Breyer
believes that the international tort remedy should be made available “only
where distinct American interests are at issue.”112  He believes that this limi-
tation “also should help to minimize international friction.”113  Breyer sug-
gests three situations involving a distinct American interest, but only two have
any significance.114  He believes that an extraterritorial international tort
remedy should be available against U.S. citizens for their egregious miscon-
duct overseas and against foreigners who seek a vacation or retirement haven
105 The concept of subject matter jurisdiction is addressed in the Restatement.  Id. § 421.
106 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107 Id. at 1674.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1671.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1671; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (asking whether exercise of ATS jurisdiction would be consistent with notions
of comity).
112 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
113 Id.
114 Id.  The insignificant situation involving a distinct American interest is an “alleged
tort . . . on American soil.” Id.  As a practical matter, the federal courts are highly unlikely
to create an international tort remedy for misconduct on American soil. See supra note 91
and accompanying text.
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in the United States.115  These two situations do not offend notions of comity
because the distinct U.S. interest is obvious, and foreign nations agree that
the United States may properly create a remedy in these two situations.116
III. CASES INVOLVING DISTINCT UNITED STATES INTERESTS
Notwithstanding the Court’s refusal to create a tort remedy in foreign-
cubed cases like Kiobel, the United States has a self-evident interest in provid-
ing a remedy in these cases.  We are part of an international community and
are more or less committed to and bound by the values embodied in interna-
tional law.  Presumably all the Justices agree that the United States has an
interest in giving effect to well-established principles of international law.117
Therefore Kiobel must be read as a decision that this obvious national inter-
est, standing alone, is not enough to warrant the judicial creation of a rem-
edy in foreign-cubed cases.  This does not mean that the United States has no
interest in giving effect to rights under international law in a foreign-cubed
case.  It does mean, however, that absent additional considerations, a judge-
made, common law remedy is not available.  In cases involving considerations
either not present or not considered in Kiobel, a far stronger argument can
be made in favor of the creation of a remedy.
A. Constitutional Considerations
Where relevant, the Constitution’s framework of government always
should be considered.  Under the plan of the Constitution, primary responsi-
bility for making foreign policy is vested in the President and Congress, while
the judiciary plays a distinctly secondary role.118  In this regard, international
tort actions obviously implicate the nation’s foreign policy.119  Therefore,
when shaping the substantive scope of the tort remedy, courts should wel-
come foreign policy insights from the (more) political branches of govern-
ment.  In particular, there is an established principle that in considering the
disposition of a particular international tort case, “federal courts should give
serious weight to the executive branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign
policy.”120  Certainly, courts should not effectively bar either Congress or the
115 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
116 See infra notes 152–56, 162–66 and accompanying text.
117 In particular, Justice Breyer’s requirement of “distinct American interest” appar-
ently means something more than the general interest of all nations to give effect to inter-
national law.
118 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION chs. II–V
(2d ed. 1996).
119 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
120 Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1671, 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that federal courts should give deference to the
foreign policy views of the executive).  The Sosa Court noted this principle in the specific
context of an international tort action against U.S. corporations.  The practice of defer-
ence to the executive branch in cases implicating foreign policy is a murky subject. See
Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort
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executive branch from the foreign policy process.  Unfortunately, however, a
decision regarding the tort’s extraterritorial reach can have precisely this
exclusionary effect.
On balance, Congress has championed the concept of an international
tort action.  The First Congress enacted the ATS using broad language that
encompassed “all causes.”121  More significantly, insofar as the substantive
scope of the tort is concerned,122 Congress chose in 1948 to reenact the stat-
ute.123  While the ATS does not directly address the modern concept of a
federal tort action, the TVPA does.  In enacting this recent legislation, Con-
gress was fully aware of the Filartiga decision and consciously chose to
endorse and codify that decision.124  Moreover, Congress’s clear purpose was
to enact an extraterritorial remedy for violations of international law in a
foreign-cubed case.  The TVPA must be read as a conscious legislative
endorsement of the concept of an international tort remedy in a foreign-
cubed torture case.
To be sure, the TVPA does not specifically address a tort remedy for
aiding and abetting torture, but nothing in the statute even hints at the possi-
bility that the victims of aiding and abetting torture should be denied a rem-
edy.  Indeed, the statute’s legislative history establishes precisely the opposite
intent.125  To say that the statute precludes a common law remedy for aiding
and abetting defies common sense.  For example, consider a slight variation
of the alleged facts in Kiobel.  Suppose that a U.S. corporation, with
full knowledge of what was to transpire, helicoptered governmental kill
teams into a remote village to murder and torture the inhabitants.  Sup-
pose further, as was alleged in Kiobel, that the corporation, with full know-
ledge of the mission’s purpose, was paying the kill teams’ salaries.  What
is the possible basis of a credible distinction between providing a remedy
Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 612–18 (2013).  There is no doubt, however, that it exists.
The practice probably is not subject to principled analysis.
121 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
122 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
123 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006).
124 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3–4 (1991) (citing the Filartiga decision as dem-
onstrating the need for the TVPA legislation); S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–4 (1991) (same).
125 The House Report explains:
[C]laims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of
actions that may appropriately be covered be [sic] section 1350.  That statute
should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or
may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4.
Likewise, the Senate Report provides that “claims based on torture or summary execu-
tion do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by section 1350.
Consequently, that statute should remain intact.” S. REP. NO. 102–249, at 5 (footnote
omitted).
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against the torturers but not against a fully complicit American aider and
abettor?126
Congress, through the ATS and especially the TVPA, has recognized and
endorsed the concept of an international tort action.  In marked contrast,
the executive branch’s judgment has been mixed.  In Filartiga, which was a
foreign-cubed case, President Carter’s Administration supported the tort
remedy,127 as did the Clinton Administration.128  More recently, President
Obama’s Administration has espoused a more nuanced approach to extrater-
ritoriality in ATS litigation.129  In contrast, the Reagan and Bush II Adminis-
trations vehemently opposed ATS litigation.130  As a matter of constitutional
government, it would be a mistake to view either of these diametrically
opposed attitudes as either correct or incorrect.  Rather, the differing views
quite properly represent differing visions of foreign policy.  The best reading
of this mixed record is the unexceptional conclusion that different Presi-
dents have different visions of appropriate foreign policy.  Indeed, one of the
primary purposes of a presidential election is to empower the voters to affirm
or reject existing presidential policies.  When the Court determines the extra-
territorial reach of the common law remedy, the Court is, in effect, prefer-
ring one past President’s view of foreign policy over another President’s
vision.  The Court, however, does not ordinarily pick winners and losers in
foreign policy disputes.
As a practical matter, a judicial decision to deny an extraterritorial rem-
edy will bar some Presidents from implementing their views of appropriate
foreign policy.  If a President, like President Carter, President Clinton, or
President Obama, believes that foreign policy is best served by bringing inter-
national tortfeasors to justice, the President’s only political remedy will be to
go hat-in-hand to Congress.  The net result is that the Supreme Court will
have made a foreign policy decision that literally preempts the President
from the foreign policy decision-making process.  Under the plan of the Con-
126 Kiobel, itself, involved a foreign aider and abettor and therefore implicated foreign
policy concerns that are not present in a suit against a U.S. corporation. See supra notes
78–79 and accompanying text.
127 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 INT’L LEG. MATERIALS 585, 601–06
(1984); see Stephens, supra note 89, at 1481–82.
128 See Stephens, supra note 89, at 1504.
129 In Kiobel, the government argued against an extraterritorial remedy but cautioned
against a general one-size-fits-all rule regarding extraterritoriality: “Other claims based on
conduct in a foreign country should be considered in light of the circumstances in which
they arise.”  Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Par-
tial Affirmance at 5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491).  In particular, the government cautioned that an extraterritorial ATS remedy
against “a U.S. national or corporation” might be appropriate. Id. at 21.  The Obama
Administration expressly disclaimed the Bush II Administration’s more categorical argu-
ment against extraterritoriality in two prior cases. Id. at 21 n.11.
130 See Stephens, supra note 89, at 1486–87, 1504–05.  The Obama Administration has
rejected the Bush II Administration’s categorical approach. See supra note 129.
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stitution, the Court should be leery of forbidding particular Presidents from
implementing their particular visions of appropriate foreign policy.
In sharp contrast, a Supreme Court decision in favor of an extraterrito-
rial remedy will not preempt either Congress or the President.  Whether the
Court holds for or against the extraterritorial remedy, the Congress may cor-
rect the Court’s decision.131  More significantly, if the Court holds in favor of
an extraterritorial remedy, the Court will not preempt Presidents whose views
of foreign policy lead them to disfavor the international tort action.  These
Presidents may still provide statements of interest to the courts on a case-by-
case basis.  As the Sosa Court noted, in particular cases the “federal courts
should give serious weight to the executive branch’s view.”132
In the context of Chevron deference to agency interpretations of stat-
utes,133 Justice Scalia has considered the interaction between judicial deci-
sionmaking and changing executive branch policies.134  One of his insights is
that the proper meaning of an ambiguous statute might change over time:
“[I]t seems to me desirable that [an agency] be able to suit its actions to the
times, and that continuing political accountability be assured, through direct
political pressures upon the Executive and through the indirect political
pressure of Congressional oversight.”135  In Scalia’s mind, if the Supreme
Court were to pronounce its own vision as an authoritative interpretation of a
statute, the judicial interpretation would preempt the executive branch’s
power to interpret and reinterpret the law to fit the times.  He believes that
“[o]ne of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities is
that they resolve them for ever and ever; only statutory amendment can pro-
duce a change.”136  Elsewhere, Justice Scalia has argued against this “ossifica-
tion of federal law.”137  The issue of extraterritoriality does not involve
Chevron deference, but a holding that there is no extraterritorial remedy nev-
ertheless will ossify federal law and place the issue beyond the control of a
President whose views of appropriate foreign policy do not coincide with the
Court’s judgment.
In United States v. Mendoza,138 Chief Justice Rehnquist voiced this same
concern about preempting changes of policy from one President to another.
Writing for a unanimous Court, he held that the ordinary rules of offensive
issue preclusion should not be applied against the United States itself.  He
explained that “the panoply of important public issues raised in government
litigation may quite properly lead successive administrations of the executive
131 Given Congress’s generally expansive approach to this tort remedy, see supra notes
121–25 and accompanying text, it is reasonable to favor an extraterritorial remedy.
132 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); see supra note 45 and accom-
panying text.
133 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 513.
135 Id. at 518.
136 Id. at 517.
137 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247, 249 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
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branch to take differing positions with respect to the resolution of a particu-
lar issue.”139  Therefore, the Court unanimously refused to apply nonmutual
collateral estoppel to bar the Reagan Administration from re-litigating a spe-
cific issue previously decided by a district court in the Carter
Administration.140
To quote Justice Scalia, when the Court bars the international tort rem-
edy’s extraterritorial application, the rule of decision applies “for ever and
ever,”141 and there is an “ossification of federal law.”142  Justice Scalia gave
scant attention to the possibility that Congress might change the law to fit
changing times.  Perhaps he thinks that the enormous friction and inertia
inherent in the legislative process significantly restricts Congress’s practical
ability to amend or correct Supreme Court error.  If so, a judicial determina-
tion to deny the remedy’s extraterritorial reach will significantly limit Con-
gress’s ability to implement its view of appropriate policy.  This restriction on
the remedy seems inconsistent with Congress’s general endorsement of the
concept of an international tort action in the ATS and especially the TVPA.
In the case of Chevron deference, executive agencies derive their power
from a congressional delegation, and if Congress is dissatisfied with the
agency’s or the Court’s interpretation of the law, Congress in theory may
correct the interpretation.  But in the case of international tort actions, an
ossification of federal law directly implicates the executive’s independent
constitutional power to participate in shaping foreign policy.  Notwithstand-
ing the executive’s clear constitutional role in the arena of foreign affairs and
the equally clear foreign policy implications of the international tort action, a
ruling against extraterritoriality inevitably will exclude the executive branch
from implementing some particular President’s visions of proper foreign
policy.
If a particular President believes that an expansive approach to the tort
action is in the nation’s best interest, a judicial determination against extra-
territorial applications forecloses the President’s ability to guide the nation’s
foreign policy regarding the enforcement of international law.  To be sure,
the President might beg Congress to change the Court’s decision, but this
would place the President in a distinctly subordinate role with respect to for-
eign policy.  To repeat, friction and inertia in Congress would seriously
impede the President’s ability to participate in the process.  The President
would be at the mercy of Congress.  This is contrary to the Constitution’s
allocation of independent presidential authority to participate in making the
nation’s foreign policy.  The practical result would be to ossify the Supreme
139 Id. at 161; id. at 164; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mut. Automo-
bile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of
its programs and regulations.”).
140 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 154.
141 Scalia, supra note 134, at 517.
142 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 249–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court’s policy judgment and to place the Court over the head of the Presi-
dent in making foreign policy on this particular issue.
Of course, it is an empirical fact that some Presidents have had and
probably will have a more jaundiced view of the international tort action, but
to repeat: a ruling that the tort has extraterritorial scope will not freeze these
Presidents out of the process.  If a President believes that particular litigation
is detrimental to foreign policy, the executive has the power to influence the
litigation by submitting a statement of interest to the court.  This avenue for
executive relief cannot be dismissed as mere theory.  Federal courts clearly
pay careful attention to executive statements of foreign policy concerns.143
The administration of foreign policy is a highly nuanced and constantly
changing process that is disserved by blanket rules like the presumption
against extraterritoriality.  In this regard, some overseas depredations by U.S.
corporations may shock the conscience of an administration inclined as a
general matter to dislike international tort actions.  Moreover, so few interna-
tional tort actions are actually filed that a case-by-case analysis will not over-
whelm the executive.
B. United States Markets
In some cases, a strong argument can be made that the United States has
a distinct and significant economic interest in a corporation’s third-world
depredations.  The allegations in Kiobel of corporate torture, murder, and
other despicable misconduct, if true, are impossible to explain on any basis
other than that Royal Dutch embarked upon these depredations in order to
gain a commercial advantage in the extraction of Nigerian oil.  In recent
years, Nigeria has accounted for nine to eleven percent of U.S. crude oil
imports.144  If a significant amount of Royal Dutch’s Nigerian oil is being
sold in the United States through Shell Oil, its wholly owned subsidiary,145
the Shell family of corporations has obtained a competitive advantage in its
sales to U.S. markets—an advantage obtained through alleged torture, mur-
der, and other heinous acts.
Using market systems to allocate goods and services is one of the most
important public policies in our society.  Many believe that our market econ-
omy brought us victory in the Cold War.  When one competitor gains a com-
143 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).  In Samantar v.
Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), the Court held that the individual defendant was not enti-
tled to the protection of foreign sovereign immunity, but left open the possibility that the
defendant might be entitled to a defense of official immunity. Id. at 2292–93.  On
remand, the district judge rejected the official immunity defense, because the “govern-
ment has determined that the defendant does not have foreign official immunity.”  Yousuf
v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360, 2011 WL 7445583, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011).
144 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NIGERIA OVERVIEW 12 (2013), available at http://www.eia
.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf.  More recently, the percentage has
gone down but still remains significant. Id.
145 See HOOVER’S INC., HOOVER’S COMPANY RECORDS: SHELL OIL COMPANY 2 (2014).
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petitive advantage over others through torture and murder, the market’s
operation becomes distorted by unlawful and unacceptable advantages.  Such
a conscious assault on our domestic system for allocating goods and services
should be enough to support a judicial remedy.
The Court briefly considered a similar market-based argument in
F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,146 which involved the extraterri-
torial reach of the Sherman Act’s price-fixing rules.  Hoffmann was a foreign-
cubed case in which the foreign plaintiffs alleged that an international price-
fixing conspiracy injured the plaintiffs in a foreign country.  The plaintiffs
argued that extending the Sherman Act to these facts would “help protect
Americans against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury.”147  The Court rec-
ognized the validity of the argument but held that the domestic effect was
“neither clear enough, nor of such likely empirical significance, that it could
overcome” the interpretative presumption against extraterritoriality.148
In an international tort action, the basis for an extraterritorial remedy is
significantly stronger than in Hoffman.  The norms or rules of conduct under
international tort laws are not unilaterally imposed by the United States on
activities in a foreign country.  They are norms that the foreign country,
itself, has embraced as a member of the family of nations.  In addition, Hoff-
man involved an international conspiracy that directly harmed U.S. citizens in
the United States.  In other words, there was a readily available pool of U.S.
plaintiffs to sue and thereby assure the existence of fair competition in the
U.S. market.  In the case of international torts, U.S. citizens seldom have
standing to challenge unfair competitive advantages acquired abroad
through torture and murder.  Without an international tort remedy, there
will be no one with standing to protect U.S. buyers and sellers from despica-
ble competitive misconduct.
Chief Justice Roberts has expressed some concern regarding the prob-
lem of entrusting a private plaintiff with the power to force federal courts to
adjudicate violations of international law.149  This concern, however, is signif-
icantly offset by the many restrictions placed upon the private plaintiff’s
power.  Moreover, the idea of using international tort plaintiffs as private
attorneys general to accomplish societal goals unrelated to the plaintiff’s spe-
cific injuries is no stranger to tort law.  Every first semester law student learns
that the fundamental purposes of tort law are to compensate and to deter,
and deterrence is not limited to the specific defendant who coincidentally is
sued in any particular case.150  Recidivism is relatively rare among tortfeasors.
By making an example of a particular defendant’s misconduct, tort law
implements general societal values to deter others from committing torts.  In
146 542 U.S. 155, 174–75 (2004).
147 Id. at 174.
148 Id. at 174–75.
149 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013).
150 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 19 (2000).  William Prosser made essen-
tially the same point over seventy years ago. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 27–28 (1941).
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addition, when Congress was considering the TVPA, the executive branch
and some Senators specifically argued that empowering plaintiffs to become
private attorneys generally would create foreign policy difficulties.151  Never-
theless, Congress rejected this argument and enacted the TVPA.  What is the
possible basis for arguing that private attorneys general are desirable in tort
actions for torture but undesirable in tort actions for consciously aiding and
abetting torture?
C. United States Citizens as Defendants
Justice Breyer, with three Justices concurring, argued that there is an
especially strong case for allowing a common law remedy against an Ameri-
can citizen who has violated international law in a foreign country.152  A
country’s interest in regulating its own citizen’s despicable misconduct in a
foreign country has been recognized for centuries.  In 1800, John Marshall
explained,
The principle is, that the jurisdiction of a nation extends to the whole of its
territory, and to its own citizens in every part of the world. . . . This princi-
ple . . . is supported everywhere by public opinion, and is recognized by
writers on the law of nations.153
More recently, the American Law Institute has recognized this fundamental
principle,154 and foreign nations agree.155  In Kiobel, the European Commis-
sion, writing as amicus curiae, advised that it is “ ‘uncontroversial’ that the
‘United States may . . . exercise jurisdiction over ATS claims involving con-
duct committed by its own nationals within the territory of another
sovereign.’”156
To be sure, any lawyer worth her salt can conjure hypothetical situations
where a foreign country might wish to shelter a U.S. corporation from
responsibility for mistreating the foreign country’s citizens.157  Of course,
there may be unusual situations in which a foreign government has a legiti-
mate interest in coming to the aid of a U.S. corporation.  These unusual
situations should be handled on an ad hoc basis in which a court would con-
151 See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 13 (1991) (minority views) (noting that the TVPA “might
create serious difficulties with the management of foreign policy”).
152 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
153 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 597 (1800) (statement of Rep. John Marshall).
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2) (1987).
155 See Cassel, supra note 88, at 1778–79, 1782.
156 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of the European
Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 11, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)).
157 For example, a clever lawyer might argue that the availability of a tort remedy would
discourage the American corporation from assisting the foreign country in developing the
country’s natural resources.  This possibility should be viewed in light of the sad fact that
many—probably most—situations giving rise to an international tort action involve a for-
eign government’s complicity with the violation of international law.
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sider specific representations from the country involved and statements of
interest from the federal government’s executive branch.  In Sosa, the Court
recommended this ad hoc solution in discussing a specific suit against a U.S.
corporation.158
In considering the availability of an extraterritorial remedy, a court
should not blind itself to the presence of other U.S. interests beyond the
mere nationality of the defendant.  For example, our citizens typically are
present in the United States.  In addition, the United States has a general
interest in giving effect to clearly established principles of international law.
Moreover, courts should be reluctant to preempt the foreign policy views of
Presidents who have a more expansive view of the tort remedy.
Finally, many suits against U.S. corporations implicate the proper func-
tioning of the U.S. market system. As an example, plaintiffs in a suit involving
Chiquita Brands International, Inc. have alleged that Chiquita has aided and
abetted heinous violations of international law as part of its banana opera-
tions in Columbia.159  Like the Kiobel case, the purpose of this alleged mis-
conduct, if true, is to gain a market advantage in the sale of bananas, and in
the Chiquita case, most of the bananas are destined for the U.S. market.
When an American has knowingly violated well-established international law
overseas to gain a market advantage in the United States, why should courts
presume that the American is not responsible for this despicable
misconduct?
The extent to which Royal Dutch was marketing its Nigerian oil in the
United States is not entirely clear.  On the other hand, Chiquita bananas
obviously are destined primarily for American markets.  If Chiquita is violat-
ing international law to gain a marketing advantage in the United States,
there is a significant harm to competitors like Dole, Del Monte, and fledgling
banana operations in Florida and California.  At the same time, these com-
petitors lack standing to sue Chiquita because they have not been directly
harmed by the tortious misconduct in Columbia.  Under the circumstances,
Chiquita’s actions have a substantial and consciously intended impact on the
territory of the United States.  In the American Law Institute’s words, the
United States has “jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct
outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory.”160
The alleged facts in Chiquita involve a classic case of the effects corollary
to the principle of territoriality.  Notwithstanding Justice Holmes’ opinion
that antitrust legislation should not be applied to conduct in another coun-
try, later courts eventually decided that the Sherman Act regulated conduct
158 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
159 In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1305–06 (S.D. Fla. 2011).  I
assume for the purpose of discussing extraterritoriality that the plaintiffs in Chiquita have
alleged conduct that violates principles of international law that are accepted by the
world’s nations.
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1987).
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in foreign countries that had or was intended to have a substantial effect in
the United States.161  If the allegations in Chiquita are true, Chiquita inten-
tionally committed a tort in Columbia with the expectation that its tortious
conduct would have a substantial effect on its sale of bananas in the United
States.  The allegations make no sense unless Chiquita was intentionally seek-
ing a market advantage.  Why would a business corporation violate interna-
tional law unless it sees a substantial advantage?  Even using an amoral
calculus, a tortfeasor surely would not engage in despicable misconduct that
would not result in a substantial advantage to the tortfeasor.
D. United States as a Safe Haven
Justice Breyer believes that a tort remedy should be available against for-
eigners who come to the United States after violating clearly established
international law in a foreign country.  The United States should not be a
safe haven for its own citizens, and the same is true of foreigners who come
to America.  This is exactly what happened in the Filartiga case that started
the modern tort action.  After torturing Joelito Fila´rtiga to death in Paraguay,
the torturer came to New York and overstayed his visa.162  The torturer’s pur-
pose was unclear.  Perhaps he was on vacation or perhaps he wished to
become a permanent resident.
Why would the United States want to become a vacation or retirement
home for torturers?  Members of Congress had this specific issue in mind
when the TVPA was enacted.  The Senate Report for the TVPA explained
that the Act would “mak[e] sure that torturers and death squads will no
longer have a safe haven in the United States,”163 and many members of
Congress reiterated this precise point in floor debates.164  Given this clear
congressional policy judgment, why would the United States wish to become
a vacation and retirement haven for those who consciously aid and abet
torture?
When someone comes to the United States, she submits herself to U.S.
domestic law.  This fundamental rule has been clear at least since 1689 when
Ulrich Huber wrote that “persons within the limits of a government, whether
they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed” subject to the gov-
ernment’s laws.165  Consistent with this centuries old concept, “the United
161 The leading opinion came from Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  The effects corollary has been expanded
beyond the Sherman Act to all situations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987).
162 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–89 (2d Cir. 1980).
163 S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3 (1991).
164 See 138 CONG. REC. S2667–69 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992) (statement of Sen. Specter);
137 CONG. REC. H11244 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli); 135 CONG.
REC. H6423–24 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Brooks); id. at H6424 (state-
ment of Rep. Bereuter); id. at H6426 (statement of Rep. Leach).
165 Ulrich Huber, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 136, 164 (Ernest G. Lorenzen ed., 1947).  Huber’s brief essay is reputed to be the
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 29  8-MAY-14 8:48
2014] the  ats  cause  of  action  is S U I G E N E R I S 1573
Kingdom and the Netherlands, while not authorizing such damage actions
themselves, tell us that they would have no objection to the exercise of Amer-
ican jurisdiction in cases such as Filartiga and Marcos” in which the foreign
tortfeasor voluntarily came to the United States.166
E. Other Considerations
There may be cases involving other considerations that involve a distinct
U.S. interest.  For example, what about an international outlaw who seeks a
financial safe haven in the United States?  The power and comparative stabil-
ity of our economy makes the United States one of the world’s safest markets
for capital investment.  Suppose an international outlaw wishes to harbor her
wealth in the United States without actually coming to the United States.  A
good argument can be made in favor of a remedy against such a person.  The
United States has a distinct interest in not becoming a financial safe haven
for international outlaws.
Finally, suppose that a U.S. citizen has been tortured in a foreign coun-
try.  The United States has an obvious interest in protecting our citizens who
venture abroad.  Congress agrees, and in the TVPA, Congress consciously
and specifically provided for suits by our citizens.  If the remedy is available
against torturers, the remedy should also be available against those who con-
sciously aid and abet the torture of one of our citizens.  This would be espe-
cially true where the aider and abettor is a U.S. corporation or citizen.
The idea that a country may protect its citizens abroad is called the “pas-
sive personality principle”167 and is somewhat controversial in international
law: “The principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts.”168
But an international tort action is not an ordinary tort.  The passive personal-
ity principle is controversial in significant part because of the element of
unfair surprise.169  In the case of an international tort action, however, a
defendant cannot claim unfair surprise.  No one should be heard to say that
they actually thought that aiding and abetting torture is okay.
CONCLUSION
Over thirty years ago, the federal courts in the Filartiga case fashioned a
common law tort remedy for the violation of a clearly established rule of
international law. Filartiga was a foreign-cubed case, and the executive
branch lent its full support to the creation of the remedy. Filartiga was a
torture case, and some twenty years later, Congress formally endorsed the
most widely read document on conflict of laws, and he was the first to use the phrase
“conflict of laws.” See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.5 (3d ed. 2000).
166 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1676 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
167 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
cmt. g (1987).
168 Id.
169 See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901–03 (D.D.C. 1988).
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new tort remedy and expanded it to include extrajudicial killing and to make
the remedy available to U.S. citizens.
In the beginning, the new tort remedy’s substantive scope was unclear,
but there obviously was a need to craft significant limitations to the rem-
edy.170  Since Filartiga, both Congress and the courts have adopted a number
of important restrictions on the plaintiff’s right to recover.  The Court’s deci-
sion in Kiobel is one of these restrictions.
In determining the breadth of Kiobel’s extraterritorial restriction, courts
should not ignore other restrictions already in place.  The remedy is only
available for a small handful of rights that are clearly embraced by the inter-
national community, and these rights were consciously crafted by the world’s
nations to outlaw specific and egregious misconduct in all of the world’s
nations.  Moreover, as a matter of comity, the tort remedy is not available
with respect to misconduct in the foreign country if that country provides a
meaningful remedy.  Finally, even if one of the clearly defined rules of inter-
national law has been violated and the lex loci delicti does not provide a mean-
ingful remedy, the courts may nevertheless limit the remedy in a particular
case based upon an ad hoc statement of interest from the executive branch.
All these significant limitations (and others) are fully applicable in every case
in which a plaintiff seeks an extraterritorial remedy.
If anything, the array of powerful restrictions upon the tort remedy sup-
ports a mild presumption in favor of an extraterritorial remedy.  After all, the
international tort remedy involves truly heinous conduct like the slave trade,
genocide, and consciously aiding and abetting torture and murder.  Why
would the United States not want to provide a narrowly constricted tort rem-
edy for misconduct that all the world’s nations, including the United States,
condemn as a matter of international law?  The presumption in favor of the
remedy is also supported by the constitutional consideration that courts
should not preempt a particular President’s view of appropriate foreign
policy.
To say that there should be a presumption in favor of the severely lim-
ited extraterritorial tort remedy is not to say that the presumption may not be
overcome.  In Kiobel, all of the Justices believed that foreign policy concerns
justified refusing to create a remedy.  The plaintiffs, however, did not allege,
and the Justices did not consider, the presence of a significant impact on the
United States’ market system.  Nor did the case involve any other distinct
U.S. interest.
In determining whether an extraterritorial remedy is available in other
classes of cases, the Court should reconsider the relevance of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality.  In international tort actions, the presumption
only makes sense as a proxy for foreign policy concerns.  To repeat: Kiobel
should be read as being based upon foreign policy concerns and not the
blind application of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  If a particu-
170 See, e.g., Casto, supra note 9, at 472 n.33.
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lar class of cases does not generally implicate foreign policy concerns and
involves the vindication of a distinct U.S. interest, the presumption has little
relevance.
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